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HARMLESS ERROR IN FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS
AFTER BRECHT v. ABRAHAMSON
JOHN H. BLUME*
STEPHEN P GARVEY**

The law of habeas corpus has changed again.1 This time it was
the law of harmless error. Before Brecht v. Abrahamson,2 the
courts applied the same harmless error rule on direct appeal and m
federal habeas corpus. Under that rule, embraced for constitutional errors in Chapman v. California,3 a conviction tainted by a
constitutional error susceptible to harmless error analysis could be
upheld only if the state demonstrated that the error was harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt. After Brecht, the venerable Chapman
rule still applies to constitutional errors identified and reviewed on
direct appeal, but an ostensibly "less onerous" standard applies to
constitutional errors identified and reviewed on federal habeas
corpus.4 Under this standard, derived from Kotteakos v. United
States,5 and once used only for nonconstitutional errors, a conviction tainted by constitutional error "requires reversal only if it
* Executive Director, South Carolina Death Penalty Resource Center. B.A., University of
North Carolina, Chapel Hill; M.A.R., J.D., Yale University.
** Associate, Covington & Burling. B.A., Colgate University; M.Phil., Oxford University;
J.D., Yale University.
The authors would like to thank Debra Czuba, Tom Swigert and Mary Beth Welch for
their research assistance.
1. Changes in the law of habeas corpus have been wrought by a string of recent cases.
See, e.g., Sawyer v. Whitley, 112 S. Ct. 2514 (1992) (narrowly defining "miscarriage of justice" exception as applied to penalty phase of capital trial); Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 112 S.
Ct. 1715 (1992) (requiring habeas petitioner to show "cause and prejudice" for failing to
develop material facts in state court before being entitled to federal evidentiary hearing);
Coleman v. Thompson, 111 S. Ct. 2546 (1991) (explicitly overruling "deliberate bypass"
standard for excusing state procedural default); McCleskey v. Zant, 111 S. Ct. 1454 (1991)
(requiring habeas petitioner to show "cause and prejudice" to excuse abusive claims in successive petitions); Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989) (plurality opinion) (establishing new
doctrine of nonretroactivity). For cases applying Teague, see Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227
(1990); Saffie v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484 (1990); Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407 (1990).
2. 113 S.Ct. 1710 (1993).
3. 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
4. Brecht, 113 S.Ct. at 1721-22.
5. 328 U.S. 750 (1946).
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'had substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining

the jury's verdict.'"
The Court was sharply divided in Brecht. The opinion of the
Court was delivered by Chief Justice Rehnquist and joined by Justices Stevens, Scalia, Kennedy and Thomas. Justice Stevens, who
provided the critical fifth vote, wrote a separate concurring opinion
"to emphasize that the [Brecht] standard is appropriately demanding."" Justice Stevens' separate concurring opinion deserves
careful attention because it diverges from that of the Chief Justice
in several ways, making Justice Stevens' version of the BrechtKotteakos test much more favorable to habeas petitioners than
that advanced by the Chief Justice.
The following Article provides a concise overview and analysis of
Brecht, focusing especially on the opinions of the Chief Justice and
Justice Stevens. It explores the structure of the Brecht-Kotteakos
rule, both as articulated in the Brecht opinion and as interpreted
thus far by the lower federal courts. Its principal conclusion is that
on careful analysis the Brecht-Kotteakos rule and the Chapman
rule, though doubtlessly different, turn out not to be that different.
Finally, this Article examines various exceptions to the BrechtKotteakos rule, as well as the limited authority of the federal
habeas courts to apply harmless error analysis to errors infecting
the penalty phase of a capital trial.
I. THE STRUCTURE OF THE BRECHT-KOTTEAKOS RULE

Brecht came to the Supreme Court from the Seventh Circuit, in
which Judge Easterbrook held that when a federal habeas court
reviews a state conviction tainted by a Doyle error," the proper
harmless error standard was not that of Chapman, but rather the
6. Brecht, 113 S. Ct. at 1718 (quoting Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 776). Because the Supreme
Court announced and applied the Brecht-Kotteakos rule in Brecht itself, at least one court
has held that Brecht applies retroactively. See Henry v. Estelle, 993 F.2d 1423, 1427 (9th
Cir. 1993). The better explanation is probably that Brecht applies retroactively under the
rationale of Lockhart v. Fretwell, 113 S. Ct. 838, 844 (1993), indicating in dicta that changes
in constitutional rules beneficial to a state's interest in finality apply retroactively.
7. Brecht, 113 S. Ct. at 1723 (Stevens, J., concurring). The remaining Justices each wrote
dissents, in which Justices White and O'Connor offered extended analyses.
8. A violation of the Due Process Clause arises when the state uses a criminal defendant's
post-Miranda silence to impeach him at trial. See Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976).
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more forgiving standard of Kotteakos.9 Judge Easterbrook confined his analysis to the peculiar nature of the Doyle rule as "a
prophylactic rule designed to protect another prophylactic rule
[i.e., the Miranda rule] from erosion or misuse."' 10 As he stated
elsewhere, "there is much less need to enforce [these] rules on collateral attack than there is to enforce 'core' constitutional rules."",
The Supreme Court rejected this relatively narrow holding in favor
of a broader one under which the Kotteakos rule was extended to
encompass all "trial errors," prophylactic or otherwise.
The Chapman rule and the Brecht-Kotteakos rule both have canonical formulations, which the lower courts undoubtedly will tend
to recite without further analysis. Under Chapman, a constitutional error requires reversal unless the state-the "beneficiary of
the error"-can "prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error
complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.""3 Under
Brecht-Kotteakos, a constitutional error requires reversal only if it
" 'had substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining
the jury's verdict.' " 4
These canonical formulations are hard to compare. To determine
how the two rules differ, they need to be mapped onto a common
matrix. To that end, any harmless error rule can be separated into
four different elements. These elements specify (1) who bears the
burden of proof to show that the error is or is not harmless; (2)
what that burden is; (3) what the requisite standard of "prejudice"
is (i.e., how likely is it that the error did or did not affect the verdict); and (4) what "approach" the reviewing court must take to

9. See Brecht v. Abrahamson, 944 F.2d 1363, 1375 (7th Cir. 1991). Judge Cudahy concurred in the judgment but dissented to the applicable standard of review. Id. at 1376.
10. Id. at 1370.
11. Hunter v. Clark, 934 F.2d 856, 866 (7th Cir. 1991) (Easterbrook, J., concurring), cert.
denied, 112 S. Ct. 388 (1992).
12. See Brecht, 113 S. Ct. at 1717. The distinction between "trial error" and "structural
error" is discussed infra part I.B.
13. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967).
14. Brecht, 113 S.Ct. at 1722 (quoting Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 776). Other language used
to describe the Brecht-Kotteakos rule includes whether the error "substantially influence[d]" the jury's verdict, id. at 1722 n.9, and whether the reviewing court can state with
"fair assurance" that the error did not contribute to the verdict. See Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at
765.
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evaluate whether prejudice has been demonstrated. 5 Significantly,
the views expressed in Brecht by the Chief Justice and Justice Stevens differ on the first and fourth elements. Both Justices were
silent, as were the dissenting Justices, on the second and third
elements.
A.

Allocation of the Burden of Proof

The first element, on which the Chief Justice and Justice Stevens plainly disagreed, specifies who bears the burden of proof.
The Chief Justice intimated that Brecht and Kotteakos impose
that burden on the defendant. According to the Chief Justice,
habeas petitioners are "not entitled to habeas relief unless they
can establish that [the trial error] resulted in 'actual prejudice.' "16
Because this statement is dicta and does not address explicitly and
self-consciously to whom the burden of proof should be allocated,
the lower federal courts should not, and certainly need not, consider themselves bound by it, though some have followed it
17
nonetheless.
In contrast, Justice Stevens pointedly observed that "Kotteakos
plainly stated that unless an error is merely 'technical,' the burden
of sustaining a verdict by demonstrating that the error was harm-

15. In Chapman, the Court indicated that the second and third elements may be
equivalent, stating that
little, if any, difference [exists] between [its] statement in Fahy v. Connecticut,
375 U.S. 85 (1963), about "whether there is a reasonable possibility that the
evidence complained of might have contributed to the conviction" and requirmg the beneficiary of a constitutional error to prove beyond a reasonable doubt
that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.
Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24. Similarly, the Court in United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667
(1985), stated "that the standard of review applicable to the knowing use of perjured testimony [by the prosecution, i.e., 'any reasonable likelihood that the false testimony could
have affected the jury's verdict,'] is equivalent to the Chapman harmless-error standard."
Id. at 679-80 n.9. Despite this proposed equivalence between the second and third elements,
they are kept separate in the analysis offered here. Cf. WAYNE R. LAFAvE & JEROLD H.
ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 26.6, at 998, 1006 (1985) (indicating that the two elements
are distinct).
16. Brecht, 113 S. Ct. at 1722 (emphasis added); see also id. at 1727 (White, J.,
dissenting).
17. See Castillo v. Stainer, 997 F.2d 669, 669 (9th Cir. 1993), modifying 983 F.2d 145 (9th
Cir. 1992); Henry v. Estelle, 993 F.2d 1423, 1427 (9th Cir. 1993); Cumbie v. Singletary, 991
F.2d 715, 724 (11th Cir. 1993).
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less rests on the prosecutwn."'18 In support of his position, Justice
Stevens quoted the following passage from Kotteakos:
It is also important to note that the purpose of the bill [enacting
the federal harmless error statute upon which the Kotteakos
rule is based]
was stated authoritatively to be "to cast upon
the party seeking a new trial the burden of showing that any
technical errors that he may complain of have affected his sub-

stantial rights, otherwise they are to be disregarded." H.R. Rep.
No. 913, 65th Cong., 3d Sess., 1. But that this burden does not
extend to all errors appears from the statement which follows
immediately. "The proposed legislation affects only technical errors. If the error is of such a character that its natural effect is
to prejudice a litigant's substantial rights, the burden of sustaming a verdict will, notwithstanding this legislation rest upon
the one who clais under it."' 9

The Court in Kotteakos reiterated this same point later, stating
that "whether the burden of establishing that the error affected
substantial rights or, conversely, the burden of sustaining the verdict shall be imposed, turns on whether the error is 'technical' or is
such that 'its natural effect is to prejudice a litigant's substantial
rights.' "20 Because "[a] constitutional violation, of course, would
never fall in the 'technical' category," Justice Stevens explained
that under Kotteakos, as under Chapman, the state bears the bur21
den of demonstrating harmlessness.
18. Brecht, 113 S. Ct. at 1723 (Stevens, J., concurring) (emphasis added). Justice Stevens
also stated that Kotteakos "places the burden on prosecutors to explain why [trial errors
that affect substantial rights] were harmless." Id. '(emphasis added).
19. Id. at 1723 n.1 (citations omitted) (quoting Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 760).
20. Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 765.
21. See Brecht, 113 S. Ct. at 1723-24 (Stevens, J., concurring); accord Stoner v. Sowders,
997 F.2d 209, 213 (6th Cir. 1993); Smith v. Dixon, 996 F.2d 667, 676-77 n.13 (4th Cir. 1993).
But see Castillo, 997 F.2d at 669; Henry, 993 F.2d at 1427; Cumble, 991 F.2d at 724.
When applying the Kotteakos standard to nonconstitutional errors, the lower federal
courts have split over who bears the burden of proof. Some impose the burden on the government. See, e.g., United States v. Rivera, 900 F.2d 1462, 1469 n.4 (10th Cir. 1990) (en
banc) (holding that "[e]xcept possibly for minor, technical errors" government bears burden
of proving harmlessness); United States v. Grier, 866 F.2d 908, 920 (7th Cir. 1989); accord
United States v. Jefferson, 925 F.2d 1242, 1255 n.15 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 238
(1991); United States v. Herrera, 893 F.2d 1512, 1530 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 927
(1990); United States v. Studley, 892 F.2d 518, 530 (7th Cir. 1989).
Others impose the burden on the defendant. See, e.g., United States v. Hill, 976 F.2d 132,
143 (3d Cir. 1992) (holding that "defendant [is] required to show a reasonable probability
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In addition to the plain mandate of Kotteakos, the law governing the federal harmless error rule, Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 52(a), provides another reason to impose the burden of
proof on the state under the Brecht-Kotteakos rule. The Kotteakos standard embraced in Brecht is an interpretation of, and is
based on, the language of the statutory predecessor of the current
federal harmless error statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2111. According to that
statute, "on the hearing of any appeal or writ of certiorari in any
case, the court shall give judgment after an examination of the record without regard to errors or'22defects which do not affect the substantial rights of the parties.

Like Kotteakos, Rule 52(a) is derived from section 2111 and its
statutory predecessor. Under Rule 52(a), "[a]ny error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect substantial rights shall be
disregarded. 2 3 Only five days after handing down its opinion in
Brecht, the Court stated that the government shoulders the burden of proving harmlessness under Rule 52(a). 24 Because the
Brecht-Kotteakos rule is based on the same federal harmless error
statute as is Rule 52(a), it should follow Rule 52(a) in imposing the
burden of proving harmlessness on the state. Sharing a common
statutory source, the harmless error rules of Brecht-Kotteakos and
Rule 52(a) should also share in common the allocation of the burden of proof on the prosecution. On the question of who bears the
that the assumed error contributed to his conviction by having a substantial influence on
the minds of the jury") (citing Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States, 487 U.S. 250, 256
(1987)); United States v. Killough, 848 F.2d 1523, 1527 (11th Cir. 1988) ("The party asserting error has the burden of proving that the error prejudiced a substantial right of that
party.") (citing Howard v. Gonzales, 658 F.2d 352, 357 (5th Cir. Unit A Oct. 1981); Coughlin
v. Capitol Cement Co., 571 F.2d 290, 307 (5th Cir. 1978)).
22. 28 U.S.C. § 2111 (1988); see also Brecht, 113 S. Ct. at 1722. The predecessor of § 2111
provided that
[o]n the hearing of any appeal, certiorari, writ of error, or motion for a new
trial, in any case, civil or criminal, the court shall give judgment after an examination of the entire record before the court, without regard to technical errors,
defects, or exceptions that do not affect the substantial rights of the parties.
28 U.S.C. § 391 (1925-26 ed.). For present purposes, the differences between § 391 and
§ 2111, which result from little more than "tinker[ing]," Brecht, 113 S. Ct. at 1718 n.7, are
immaterial. See id. "[T]he enactment of § 2111 did not alter the basis for the harmlesserror standard announced in Kotteakos." Id.
23. FED. R. CRiM. P 52(a).

24. See United States v. Olano, 113 S. Ct. 1770, 1778 (1993).
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burden of proof under Brecht, uniformity is on the side of Justice
Stevens.2 5
B. Burden of Proof
The second element, the "burden of proof" for the purposes of
this Article, is the probability by which the party who bears that
burden must show something. In a criminal prosecution, the state
bears the burden of showing the existence of each element of the
offense beyond a reasonable doubt. In harmless error doctrine, the
something that must be shown is the harmlessness or harmfulness
of the error, or the probability that the error either did or did not
affect the verdict. This latter probability may be described as a
standard of "prejudice." In formal terms, therefore, the burden of
proof within the law of harmless error represents a probability of
prejudice, or a probability of another probability
Both principal opinions in Brecht are silent as to the burden of
proof. Chapman imposes on the state the burden of showing harmlessness beyond a reasonable doubt. 26 As is more fully discussed
below, one may read Brecht to impose on the state the same burden-harmlessness beyond a reasonable doubt-but still to be
"less onerous" than Chapman by weakening the applicable standard of prejudice. In other words, Brecht may retain Chapman's
"beyond a reasonable doubt" burden, but make it somewhat easier
than does Chapman to show prejudice. Militating against this construction, the Court in Kotteakos stated that it was "highly probable that the error [in that case] had substantial and injurious effect
or influence in determining the jury's verdict. '2 7 The Court's reference to "highly probable" may be taken to suggest a burden less
than "beyond a reasonable doubt," i.e., either preponderant or
clear and convincing evidence. Assuming it makes sense to distinguish between the burden of proof and the standard of prejudice,
the Brecht-Kotteakos rule should be construed to require the state
to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that the error did
25. See also Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 197 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
(stating that "[e]very harmless-error standard" employed by the Court has "shift[ed] to the
beneficiary of the error [the burden] to show that the conviction was not tainted").
26. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967).
27. Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 776.
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not have "a substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict." Anything less would needlessly jeopardize the rule's ability to protect constitutional rights and would belie Justice Stevens' assurance that the Brecht-Kotteakos rule is
"appropriately demanding."
C. Standard of Prejudice
The third element is the applicable standard of "prejudice" and
specifies the degree of probability that the error either did or did
not affect the verdict. This element is at the heart of any harmless
error rule and depends substantially on who bears the burden of
proof. Neither the Chief Justice nor Justice Stevens specifically
identified or defended a particular standard in Brecht, perhaps
leaving that task to another day and giving the lower courts an
opportunity to address the issue first.
Despite his silence in Brecht, the Chief Justice likely hopes or
intends the Brecht-Kotteakos standard of prejudice to be greater
than that of Chapman. "[G]ranting habeas relief merely because
there is a 'reasonable possibility' that trial error contributed to the
verdict," wrote the Chief Justice in Brecht, "is at odds with the
historic meaning of habeas corpus-to afford relief to those whom
society has 'grievously wronged.' ,,28 Under Chapman, the state

must show lack of prejudice by demonstrating that there was no
"reasonable possibility" that the error "contributed to the verdict." For the Chief Justice, Brecht requires "something less" of
the state.
1. Burden on the State
Assuming that the burden of proof remains on the state, the
"something less" required by Brecht probably would translate into
a weaker standard of prejudice. One such weaker standard is that
28. Brecht, 113 S. Ct. at 1721 (quoting Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24 (quoting Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85, 86 (1963))). This way of formulating the Chapman inquiry subtly
suggests that the burden is on the defendant to show that "there [was] a 'reasonable possibility' that the trial error contributed to the verdict." Although this may be a fair rendering
of Fahy, it misreads Chapman. See also Steven H. Goldberg, Harmless Error: Constitutional Sneak Thief, 71 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 421, 428 & n.77 (1980) (noting similar
legerdemain in then-Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion in Schneble v. Florida, 405 U.S.
427 (1972)).
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of a "reasonable probability" Taking this view, while Chapman
requires the state to show that there was no reasonable possibility
that the error affected the verdict, 9 Brecht-Kotteakos would require the state to show that there was no reasonable probability
that the error affected the verdict. The distinction between possibility and probability marks a central and critical divide, the importance of which should not be overlooked. The only open question is what degree of probability Brecht-Kotteakos should be held
to require.30
The Chief Justice confidently predicted in Brecht that the federal courts would not encounter any confusion m applying the Kotteakos standard because the long history of that standard had established an "existing body of case law" that would provide a clear
guide to its application.31 A body of case law has indeed developed
around Kotteakos, but the guidance it offers is less than clear.3 2
While there appears to be general agreement that the state must
show some probability that the error was harmless, there is disagreement regarding how strong that probability must be.
Many lower courts follow and rely on language in Kotteakos that
requires a reviewing court to find with "fair assurance" that the
29. See Chapman, 386 U.S. at 23-24 ("An error in admitting plainly relevant evidence
which possibly influenced the jury adversely to a litigant cannot, under Fahy, be conceived
of as harmless.") (emphasis added).
30. Literature, case law and linguistic intuition suggest the following equivalences. Each
formulation assumes the burden of proof is on the state.

Probability = 50-60%
"slightly probable that the error was harmless"
"more probable than not that the error was harmless"
"error was harmless by preponderance of the evidence"
Probability = 60-75%
"highly probable that the error was harmless"
"fair assurance that the error was harmless"
"error was harmless by clear and convincing evidence"

Probability = 75-90%
"near certainty that the error was harmless"
"error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt"

"error could not possibly have been harmful"
31. Brecht, 113 S. Ct. at 1722.
32. See, e.g., Stephen A. Saltzburg, The Harm of Harmless Error, 59 VA. L. RE V. 988,
1009 (1973) ("Although the judiciary may profess to act in reliance upon Kotteakos, the test
laid down in that case [has been] unevenly applied.").
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error was harmless. 3 Others sometimes follow the instruction m
Kotteakos that the reviewing court must grant relief if it is m
"grave doubt" as to whether or not the error was harmless.3 4 Some
courts go on to state that "fair assurance" means that it is "highly
probable" the error was harmless.3 5 Others embrace a lesser degree
of probability, saying that an "error is harmless if it is more probable than not that the prejudice resulting from the error did not
materially affect the verdict."3 6 Another court has specified no particular degree of probability, saying simply that the "test for harmlessness for nonconstitutional error is whether it is probable that
the error could have affected the verdict reached by the particular
37
jury in the particular circumstances of the trial.
In short, the Chief Justice's prediction to the contrary notwithstanding, the case law in the lower courts does not provide unequivocal guidance. Although there is general agreement that harmlessness must be shown to some probability, the courts disagree as
to the degree of probability Because Brecht departs from the gen-

33. See, e.g., United States v. Hitt, 981 F.2d 422, 425 (9th Cir. 1992); United States v.
Wood, 924 F.2d 399, 402 (1st Cir. 1991); United States v. Colombo, 909 F.2d 711, 713 (2d
Cir. 1990); United States v. Bernal, 814 F.2d 175, 184-85 (5th Cir. 1987); United States v.
Nyman, 649 F.2d 208, 211-12 (4th Cir. 1980); Government of the Virgin Islands v. Toto, 529
F.2d 278, 283-84 (3d Cir. 1976).
34. See, e.g., United States v. Tyler, 943 F.2d 420, 423 (4th Cir.) (quoting Kotteakos v.
United States, 328 U.S. 750, 756 (1946)), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 646 (1991).
35. See, e.g., Wood, 924 F.2d at 402; Colombo, 909 F.2d at 713; Nyman, 649 F.2d at 21112 (citing ROGER J. TRAYNOR, THE RIDDLE OF HARMLESS ERROR 34-35 (1970)); Toto, 529 F.2d
at 283-84 (citing TRAYNOR, supra, at 35); see also Hitt, 981 F.2d at 425 n.2 (observing that
the "fair assurance" standard "seems to have the Supreme Court's blessing"); cf. United
States v. Sands, 899 F.2d 912, 916 (10th Cir. 1990) (stating that a court must be able to say
"with reasonable certainty that the [error] had but a very slight effect on the verdict of the
jury") (internal quotations omitted); United States v. Hays, 872 F.2d 582, 588 (5th Cir.
1989) (stating that the court must be able to "conclude that the error had no effect, or only
a slight effect on the jury's decision"); United States v. Shackleford, 738 F.2d 776, 783 (7th
Cir. 1984) (stating that a court must be "convinced that the error did not influence the jury,
or had but very slight effect") (internal quotations omitted).
36. United States v. Lui, 941 F.2d 844, 848 (9th Cir. 1991); accord United States v.
Echavarria-Olarte, 904 F.2d 1391, 1398 (9th Cir. 1990); United States v. Norris, 873 F.2d
1519, 1525 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 835 (1989); United States v. Weger, 709 F.2d
1151, 1158 (7th Cir. 1983).
Judge Kozmski has detected a split within the Ninth Circuit between the "fair assurance"
or "highly probable" standard and the "more probable than not" standard. See Hitt, 981
F.2d at 425.
37. United States v. Davis, 657 F.2d 637, 640 (4th Cir. 1981).
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eral and longstanding rule that constitutional error is to be evaluated under the stringent Chapman test, courts should interpret
the Brecht-Kotteakos rule in the most demanding way possible,
resolving any ambiguity in favor of protecting the rights of the petitioner. The degree of probability therefore should be that of
"highly probable."
2. Burden on the Defendant
The assumption prior to this point has been that the burden
rests with the state. The picture naturally changes if Brecht places
the burden of proof on the defendant. As explained above, this
allocation is difficult, if not impossible, to justify. It would represent a dramatic departure from the general law of harmless error and would also render the Brecht rule inconsistent with the
plain language of Kotteakos and the law of Rule 52(a), both of
which spring from the same statutory source as does Brecht. Nonetheless, the Chief Justice stated in Brecht, albeit in dicta, that
"[u]nder [the Kotteakos] standard, habeas petitioners may obtain
plenary review of their constitutional claims, but they are not entitled to habeas relief unless they can establish that it resulted in
'actual prejudice.'

"38

Judging from this passage alone, the Chief Justice would seem
not only to impose the burden of proof on the petitioner, but also
to require him to show "actual prejudice." Yet this reference to
"actual prejudice" must be handled with some care, since it has
the potential to transform the Brecht rule into something it is not.
This potential derives from the fact that "actual prejudice" has
become a term of art in the areas of procedural default under
Wainwright v. Sykes 9 and ineffective assistance of counsel under
38. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 113 S. Ct. 1710, 1722 (1993) (citing United States v. Lane, 474
U.S. 438 (1986) (interpreting the federal harmless error statute and rule)).
An alternative reading of the phrase "affect substantial rights" does not link it to the idea
of prejudice. Instead, this interpretation classifies certain rights as "substantial" and subjects them to a rule of automatic reversal, leaving "non-substantial" rights subject to a
harmless error rule. Justice Brennan both described and rejected this approach to § 2111
and Rule 52(a) in Lane. See Lane, 474 U.S. at 455 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). Justice Stevens did not try to resurrect this approach in his concurrence
in Brecht.
39. 433 U.S. 72, 87 (1977).
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Stnckland v. Washington.4" It would, however, be a mistake to
construe prejudice under Brecht-Kotteakos to be coextensive with
"actual prejudice" under Sykes and Stnckland. Though they may
share the same linguistic formulation, Brecht prejudice is not the
same as Sykes-Strckland prejudice. To see why this is so, one
must look beneath the linguistic surface.
As noted above the Kotteakos rule-"substantial and injurious
effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict"-is derived
directly from, and is an interpretation of, the old federal harmless
error statute.41 The current version of that rule, 28 U.S.C. § 2111,
is substantially the same and provides that "[o]n the hearing of
any appeal or writ of certiorari in any case, the court shall give
judgment after an examination of the record without regard to errors or defects which do not affect the substantial rights of the
parties."42 Section 2111 is in turn embodied in the federal harmless
error rule,4 which provides that "[a]ny error, defect, irregularity or
variance which does not affect substantial rights shall be disre' Indeed, according to
garded."44
the Advisory Committee notes accompanying it, Rule 52(a) was a restatement of existing law, which
included the statutory predecessor of section 2111. 45
The key language in both Rule 52(a) and section 2111-"affect
substantial rights"-is also found in the federal "plain error"
rule,4" which states that "[p]lain errors or defects affecting substantial rights may be noticed although they were not brought to
the attention of the court.

'4 7

The Court has recently stated that

"inmost cases" this language "means that the error must have
been prejudicial: It must have affected the outcome of the District
Court proceedings." 4 8 Unlike Rule 52(a), however, Rule 52(b) im40. 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984); cf. Smith v. Dixon, 996 F.2d 667, 692-93 (4th Cir. 1993)
(Wilkins, J., dissenting) (stating that the Brecht inquiry is "precisely the analysis" required
by Strzckland and "essentially the same" analysis required by Sykes).
41. 28 U.S.C. § 391 (1925-26 ed.); Brecht, 113 S. Ct. at 1722; see also supra note 22.
42. 28 U.S.C. § 2111 (1988).
43. FED. R. CRIM. P 52(a).

44. Id.
45. Id. (advisory committee's notes).

46.

FED.

R.

CRIM.

P 52(b).

47. Id.
48. United States v. Olano, 113 S. Ct. 1770, 1778 (1993) (citing Kotteakos v. United
States, 328 U.S. 750, 758-65 (1966)); see also id. ("Normally, although perhaps not in every
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poses the burden of showing prejudice on the defendant, 49 just as
Brecht-Kotteakos would under the Chief Justice's (erroneous)
interpretation.
As under Rule 52(b), habeas petitioners bear the burden of
showing prejudice under Sykes in order to overcome a procedural
default 0 and under Strickland to state a claim that counsel has
been unconstitutionally ineffective.51 Yet insofar as the courts interpret Brecht to require habeas petitioners to show "prejudice" in
order to receive relief on the basis of a valid constitutional claim,
the meaning of "prejudice" under Brecht is not coextensive with
the meaning of "prejudice" under Sykes and Strickland. Whatever
the exact standards of prejudice under Sykes-Strickland, and
Brecht-Kotteakos, one thing is clear: prejudice under the former is
greater than prejudice under the latter. They are not one and the
same.
Frady v. United States52 demonstrates this point. In Frady,the
Court held that the proper standard of review for a section 2255
motion was not the "plain error" standard of Rule 52(b), but
rather the "cause and actual prejudice" standard of Sykes. The
Court observed that "[t]he burden of demonstrating that an erroneous instruction was so prejudicial that it will support a collateral
attack on the constitutional validity of a state court's judgment is
even greater than the showing required to establish plain error on
direct appeal."5 " In short, the showing a defendant must make
under Sykes is more difficult than the showing he must make
under Rule 52(b). Because prejudice under Rule 52(b) is the same
case, the defendant must make a specific showing of prejudice to satisfy the 'affecting substantial rights' prong of Rule 52(b)."); United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 17 n.14 (1985).
Notably, Justice Stevens argued in his dissent in Olano that
[a]t least some defects bearing on the jury's deliberative function are subject to
reversal regardless of whether prejudice can be shown, not only because it is so
difficult to measure their effects on a jury's decision, but also because such
defects "undermm[e] the structural integrity of the criminal tribunal itself."
Olano, 113 S. Ct. at 1782-83 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S.
254, 263-64 (1986)). This passage resonates with language in footnote nine of the Chief Justice's opinion in Brecht. See infra notes 102-04 and accompanying text.
49. See Olano, 113 S. Ct. at 1778.
50. See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 87 (1977).
51. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984).
52. 456 U.S. 152 (1982).
53. Id. at 166 (emphasis added) (quoting Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145, 154 (1977)).
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as that under Kotteakos-Rule 52(b), Rule 52(a) and Kotteakos
are all based on "affecting substantial rights" and so incorporate
the same standard of prejudice 54 -1t would follow from Frady that

Sykes-Strickland prejudice is greater than Brecht-Kotteakos
prejudice, just as it is greater than Rule 52(b) prejudice.
The Court noted in Frady that it had "refrained from giving
'precise content' to the term 'prejudice'" used in Sykes. 55 Although that term continues to lack precise content, at least one
pair of commentators have argued that Sykes requires a petitioner
to show that there was a "reasonable probability" that alleged error affected the verdict. 6 This is the same standard articulated in
Strickland.5 7 One standard of prejudice compared to which SykesStrickland prejudice would be greater is that of a "reasonable possibility" Brecht might thus require a petitioner to show (on the
assumption that the petitioner bears the burden of proof) only
that the error possibly could have affected the verdict, not that it
probably would have, as Sykes and Strickland require.5 8 Showing
a mere possibility of prejudice is very much easier than showing a
probability
D. Approach of the Reviewing Court
The final element, and the second on which the Chief Justice
and Justice Stevens appeared to disagree, involves the "approach"
of the reviewing court. There are two basic and analytically distmnct approaches a reviewing court may take to determine if an error is harmless. The first focuses on the error and whether it might
have contributed to the guilty verdict. The second, in contrast, fo54. See Olano, 113 S. Ct. at 1777-78.
55. Frady, 456 U.S. at 168 (quoting Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 91 (1977)).
56. See John C. Jeffries, Jr. & William J. Stuntz, Ineffective Assistance and Procedural
Default in Federal Habeas Corpus Cases, 57 U. CHI. L. REv. 679, 684 & n.25 (1990).
57. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1983).
58. Cf. 8B JAMES W MooRE, MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 52.03, at 52-5 (2d ed. 1993)
(pre-Olano commentary stating that under Fed. R. Crim. P 52(a) "error will not be found

to have affected

'substantial rights'" unless "defendant can show a reasonable possibil-

ity that the error was prejudicial") (citations omitted). But cf. United States v. Hill, 976
F.2d 132, 143 (3d Cir. 1992) (pre-Olano case holding that under Fed. R. Crim. P 52(a)
"defendant [is] required to show a reasonable probability that the assumed error contributed to his conviction by having a substantial influence on the minds of the jury") (emphasis added) (citing Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States, 487 U.S. 250, 256 (1987)).
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cuses on the outcome of the trial. It begins by eliminating the evidentiary effect of the error and then focuses on whether the evidence that remains in support of the verdict is overwhelming (not
just whether it is sufficient)." In other words,
[t]he first approach requires examining the erroneously admitted evidence, without regard to the weight of other evidence, to
determine whether the error might have swayed the factfinder
and contributed to the verdict. The second position does not
look to the tainted evidence, but to the untainted6 evidence,
and
0
asks whether it alone compels a verdict of guilty.

Despite language in Chapman indicating that a reviewing court
should use the error-focused approach,61 the courts have nonetheless used both, so that a finding
of harmlessness under Chapman
62
can be premised on either.

Although the Chief Justice does not state in so many words the
approach he endorses, his application of the rule suggests that he
would combine both. On the facts of Brecht, he reasoned that because the state's impermissible references to the defendant's post59. See, e.g., Martha A. Field, Assessing the Harmlessnessof Federal ConstitutionalEr-

ror-A Process in Need of a Rationale, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 15, 16 (1976).
60. Id. at 16-17; see also Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250, 255 (1969) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (distinguishing the two approaches).
A coerced confession is one type of error on which the two approaches will likely yield
different results. As the Kotteakos court itself explicitly recognized, a coerced confession
will almost never be harmless under the error-focused approach, see Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at
764-65 & n.19, but such error can be harmless under the outcome-focused approach as long
as there is overwhelming evidence of guilt apart from the confession.
61. See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23 (1967); see also Field, supra note 59, at 27.
62. For example, in Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570 (1986), the Court seemed to embrace the
outcome-focused approach: "Where a reviewing court can find that the record developed at
trial establishes guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the interest in fairness has been satisfied
and the judgment should be affirmed." Id. at 579. Yet in Satterwhite v. Texas, 486 U.S. 249
(1988), the Court appeared to return to the canonical form of Chapman, which embraces
the error-focused approach: "The question
is not whether the legally admitted evidence was sufficient to support the death sentence, which we assume it was, but rather,
whether the State has proved 'beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did
not contribute to the verdict obtained."' Id. at 258-59 (quoting Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24);
see also

CHARLES

H.

WHrrEBREAD & CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

§

29.06,

at 704 (1986) (suggesting a trend toward an outcome-focused overwhelming evidence test);
Field, supra note 59, at 21 ("On the whole
the cases support the propriety of an overwhelming evidence test."); Tom Stacy & Kim Dayton, Rethinking Harmless Constitutional
Error,88 COLUM. L. REv. 79, 126-31 (1988). But see Lowery v. Collins, 988 F.2d 1364, 1373
(5th Cir. 1993) (holding that Chapman requires the error-focused approach).
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Miranda silence were "infrequent" while its permissible references
to his pre-Mirandasilence were "extensive," the impermissible references were merely "cumulative."6 More importantly, the Chief
Justice also stated that "the State's evidence of guilt was, if not
overwhelming, certainly weighty "614 Based on these statements, it
is likely that the Chief Justice would instruct a reviewing court to
find an error harmless under the Brecht-Kotteakos rule if that error did not contribute to the verdict or if the untainted evidence
was overwhelming-or perhaps merely "weighty "165
Justice Stevens appeared to defend a different position. He first
took the Chief Justice to task by noting that "we would misread
Kotteakos itself if we endorsed only a single-minded focus on how
the error may (or may not) have affected the jury's verdict. The
habeas court cannot ask only whether it thinks the petitioner
would have been convicted even if the constitutional error had not
taken place." 6 To this passage he appended the following footnote, quoting language from Kotteakos: " 'The inquiry cannot be
merely whether there was enough to support the result, apart from
the phase affected by the error.' "67
Immediately thereafter Justice Stevens quoted further from
Kotteakos. He noted, for example, that Kotteakos "requires a reviewing court to decide that 'the error did not influence the jury'
and that 'the judgment was not. substantially swayed by the error.' "68 Borrowing an extensive passage from Kotteakos and admonishing "all courts that review trial transcripts" to keep it "in

63. Brecht, 113 S. Ct. at 1722.
64. Id.
65. Similarly, the Chief Justice wrote in Arizona v. Fulminante, 111 S. Ct. 1246 (1991):
"When reviewing the erroneous admission of an involuntary confession, the appellate court,
as it does with the admission of other forms of improperly admitted evidence, simply reviews the remainder of the evidence against the defendant to determine whether the admission of the confession was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at 1265. In Schneble v.
Florida, 405 U.S. 427 (1972), then-Justice Rehnquist wrote: "In some cases the properly
admitted evidence of guilt is so overwhelming and the prejudicial effect of the [error] is so
insignificant by comparison, that it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that the [error] was
harmless error." Id. at 430. This way of formulating the test indicates that the two approaches operate in tandem, with the effect of the error balanced against the extent of the
untainted evidence. See also Field, supra note 59, at 60.
66. Brecht, 113 S. Ct. at 1724 (Stevens, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
67. Id. at 1724 n.2 (emphasis added) (quoting Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 765).
68. Id. at 1724 (quoting Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 764, 765).
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mind,"69 Justice Stevens insisted that the question under Kotteakos is not
were they [the jurors]right in their judgment, regardlessof the
error or its effect upon the verdict. It is rather what effect the
error had or reasonably may be taken to have had upon the

jury's decision. The crucial thing is the impact of the thing
done wrong on the minds of other men, not on one's own, in the
total setting.
This must take account of what the error meant to them, not
singled out and standing alone, but in relation to all else that
happened. And one must judge others' reactions not by his own,
but with allowance for how others might react and not be regarded generally as acting without reason. This is the important
difference, but one easy to ignore when the sense of guilt comes
70
strongly from the record.

Interpreting the meaning of "prejudice" under the federal plain
error rule,7 1 Justice Stevens elsewhere relied on Kotteakos for the
proposition that while
it is [not] improper for the Court to evaluate the probable impact of the error on the outcome of the case[,] [i]t is important
to remember
that the question is not whether the judge is
persuaded that the defendant is guilty, but "rather what effect
the error had or reasonably may be taken to have had upon the
jury's decision. The crucial thing is the impact of the thing done
wrong on the minds of other men, not on one's own, in the total
setting." 2
These statements suggest that Justice Stevens believes a reviewing
court should focus on whether the error contributed to the verdict,
not on whether untainted evidence establishes guilt
overwhelmingly
Based on the foregoing, Justice Stevens' view of the Brecht-Kotteakos rule would appear to require reviewing courts to look first,
69. Id.
70. Id. (emphasis

added) (quoting Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 764).
71. FED. R. CRIM. P 52(b).

72. United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 36 n.4 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting
Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 764); see also LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 15, § 26.6, at 997 (stating
that Kotteakos rejected the "correct result" or "outcome-oriented" approach).
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and perhaps only, to the contribution of the error to the verdict.7 '

In contrast to that of the Chief Justice, Justice Stevens' view is
probably one of the following: (a) an error is harmless only if it did
not contribute to the verdict (whatever the other evidence); or (b)
an error is harmless only if it did not contribute to the verdict and
the untainted evidence is overwhelming.7 4 Though Justice Stevens
would thus make the error-focused approach an integral part of
the Brecht rule, experience with the Chapman and Kotteakos
rules suggests that vigilance nonetheless will be required to keep
the lower courts from lapsing into exclusive reliance on the outcome-focused approach.75
Although Justice Stevens' position on the proper approach
under Brecht seems at odds with that of the Chief Justice, he ended his concurrence in Brecht by stating that "[i]n [his] own judg73. Justice Brennan has interpreted Kotteakos in the same way:
The crucial thing [under Kotteakos] is the effect the error had in the proceedings which actually took place, not whether the same thing could have been
done in hypothetical proceedings. Harmless-error analysis is not an excuse for
overlooking error because the reviewing court is itself convinced of the defendant's guilt.
United States v. Lane, 474 U.S. 438, 465 (1986). Justice Scalia wrote in one of the Court's
latest pronouncements on harmless error: "The [Chapman] inquiry, in other words, is not
whether, in a trial that occurred without the error, a guilty verdict would surely have been
rendered, but whether the guilty verdict actually rendered in this trial was surely unattributable to the error." Sullivan v. Louisiana, 113 S. Ct. 2078, 2081 (1993).
74. Although this latter formulation is possible, one astute observer has pointed out that
it is "unlikely that a court would reverse when the error itself is so unimportant that it
could not have influenced the result." Field, supra note 59, at 19. It is therefore unlikely
that a reviewing court would require overwhelming evidence of guilt in addition to requiring
that the error did not contribute to the verdict.
75. So far, the lower courts have not analyzed Brecht carefully or applied it consistently.
Many appear to have applied an outcome-focused approach. See, e.g., Quinn v. Neal, 998
F.2d 526, 534 (7th Cir. 1993) (finding error harmless because of "overwhelming evidence"
establishing guilt); Nethery v. Collins, 993 F.2d 1154, 1159 (5th Cir. 1993); Cumbie v. Singletary, 991 F.2d 715, 725 (l1th Cir. 1993); Stewart v. Lane, Nos. 89-C-20188, 89-C-20189, 1993
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7962, at *43 (N.D. Ill. June 8, 1993); cf. Wright v. Dailman, No. 92-3771,
1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 18005, at "15 (6th Cir. July 20, 1993) (finding other evidence "sufficient to sustain the jury's guilty verdict").
Others appear to have used an error-focused approach. See, e.g., Stoner v. Sowder, 997
F.2d 209, 213 (6th Cir. 1993); Vanderbilt v. Collins, 994 F.2d 189, 199 (5th Cir. 1993);
Standen v. Whitley, 994 F.2d 1417, 1423 (9th Cir. 1993); McKinney v. Rees, 993 F.2d 1378,
1385-86 (9th Cir. 1993).
Still other courts appear to have used both. See, e.g., Pemberton v. Collins, 991 F.2d 1218,
1226-27 (5th Cir. 1993).
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ment, for the reasons explained by the Chief Justice, the Doyle
error that took place in respondent's [sic] trial did not have a substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's
verdict." ' In light of the Chief Justice's reliance on the outcomefocused approach, this passing and putative endorsement is puzzling. Yet it should not be invested with more significance than it
deserves, especially since Justice Stevens went to considerable
length to reject an approach that asked only whether the jurors
77
were "right in their judgment.
In conclusion, the Chapman rule and the Brecht-Kotteakos rule,
fairly interpreted, differ only as follows:
Chapman rule: The state must show beyond a reasonable doubt
that under the error-focused or outcome-focused approach the
trial error could not possibly have affected the verdict. 78
Brecht-Kotteakos rule: The state must show by clear and convmcing evidence that under the error-focused approach it is
highly probable that the trial error did not affect the verdict.7 '
So construed, Brecht-Kotteakos is: (1) slightly less favorable than
Chapman with respect to the burden of proof and the standard of
prejudice; (2) the same as Chapman with respect to the allocation
of the burden of proof; and (3) generally more favorable than
76. Brecht, 113 S. Ct. at 1725 (Stevens, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
77. Two other aspects of Justice Stevens' concurrence should be emphasized. First, Justice Stevens underscored the statutory obligation of the "reviewing court to evaluate the
error in the context of the entire trial record." Id. at 1724.
Second, he stressed that because the question of harmless error is a "mixed question[] of
law and fact," the standard of review is de novo. Id., accord Orndorff v. Lockhart, No. 913510, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 17482, at *16 (8th Cir. July 15, 1993) (citing Gunn v. Newsome, 881 F.2d 949, 964 (11th Cir. 1989) (en banc); Graham v. Wilson, 828 F.2d 656, 659-60
(10th Cir. 1987)); Suniga v. Bunnell, 998 F.2d 664, 667 (9th Cfr. 1993); Lowery v. Collins,
988 F.2d 1364, 1372 (5th Cir. 1993); Dickey v. Lewis, 859 F.2d 1365, 1370 (9th Cir. 1988); cf.
Rushen v. Spain, 464 U.S. 114, 120 (1983) (per curiam); Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18,
20-21 (1967). Accordingly, on direct review the state courts still must apply the Chapman
test, but the federal courts cannot accord any deference to the conclusion of a state court
that an error was harmless.
78. Cf. Field, supra note 59, at 32.
79. If, instead, the courts interpret Brecht to place the burden of proof on the defendant,
then the Brecht-Kotteakos rule would require the defendant to show prejudice, but that
would only require the defendant to show that the error possibly could have affected the
verdict.
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Chapman with respect to the approach used by the reviewing
court."0
II.

EXCEPTIONS TO THE

BRECHT-KOTTEAKos

RULE

The Brecht-Kotteakos rule applies in federal habeas corpus proceedings, but the scope of its application is limited in several important ways.8 ' For example, Brecht does not apply to "structural"
errors. Nor, the Court intimated, does it apply to cases m which
the error arose from state misconduct. Nor does it apply under certain circumstances to errors which infect the penalty phase of a
capital trial. Finally, at least one circuit court of appeals recently
has held that Brecht does not apply unless the state courts have
first applied Chapman.
A.

The Orndorff Exception

In Orndorff v. Lockhart,5 ' the Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit held that a federal court should not apply the Brecht rule
80. The Court itself once ventured the hypothesis "that § 2111 [and thus Kotteakos] by
its terms may be coextensive with Chapman." United States v. Hastings, 461 U.S. 499, 509
(1983) (emphasis added) (citing ROGER J. TRAYNOR, THE RIDDLE OF HARMLESS ERROR 41-43
(1970)); cf. Saltzburg, supra note 32, at 1009 ("Kotteakos adopted a standard of review
quite similar to the 'reasonable possibility' test
"); Donald A. Winslow, Note, Harmful
Use of Harmless Error in Criminal Cases, 64 CORNELL L. REV. 538, 550 (1979) (suggesting
that Kotteakos and Chapman standards are "ultimate[ly] similar[]").
The particular factors to which the courts tend to look to determine if an error contributed to the verdict include, among other things: (1) whether the case was "close," see, e.g.,
United States v. Urbanik, 801 F.2d 692, 699 (4th Cir. 1986); Gaither v. United States, 413
F.2d 1061, 1079 (D.C. Cir. 1969); (2) whether the issue affected by the error was "central" to
the case, see, e.g., United States v. Livingston, 661 F.2d 239, 243 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Gaither,
413 F.2d at 1079; (3) what steps, if any, the trial court took to mitigate the impact of the
error, see, e.g., Gaither,413 F.2d at 1079; (4) whether the evidence precluded by the error
was merely cumulative, see, e.g., United States v. Parry, 649 F.2d 292, 296 (5th Cir. Unit B
1981); (5) whether the prosecution emphasized the evidence admitted under the auspices of
the error, see, e.g., United States v. Ariza-Ibarra, 605 F.2d 1216, 1223-24 (ist Cir. 1979); and
(6) whether the case was tried by a judge or jury, see, e.g., Pemberton v. Collins, 991 F.2d
1218, 1226-27 (5th Cir. 1993) (suggesting that trial judges are better able than juries to
disregard effects of error).
81. There may be a wholesale exception for capital cases based on the principle that
"death is different, which generally" requires rules more favorable to capital petitioners
than non-capital petitioners. On the other hand, this type of wholesale exception seems unlikely, given that capital cases have not been exempted under this principle from any of the
other areas of habeas law recently reconstructed by the Court.
82. No. 91-3510, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 17482 (8th Cir. July 15, 1993).
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to an error identified on habeas corpus unless the state courts already had determined that the error was harmless under Chapman. If a state court fails to apply Chapman, fails to address an
alleged error or finds no error, then the federal habeas court under
Orndorff must apply Chapman instead of Brecht if it concludes
that an error does indeed exist.8 3 Unfortunately, the court in Orndorif did not explain the purpose of such an exception to Brecht's
general application on habeas corpus, and the Supreme Court had
no occasion to entertain such an exception in Brecht itself because
the state court in that case in fact had applied Chapman.4 Still,
the Orndorff exception can be readily derived from the justification advanced in Brecht for adopting the Kotteakos rule and rejecting Chapman as the appropriate rule to be used in habeas
corpus.
At its most basic, harmless error analysis represents an accommodation between a criminal defendant's interest in receiving a
remedy for the violation of a constitutional right and the state's
interest in preserving convictions where the error did not affect the
outcome of the trial. The Chapman rule is the historical result the
Court reached when it sought to accommodate those interests in
the context of direct appeal. Vet, as the Court in Brecht stated, the
configuration of interests changes when a federal court identifies
an error in habeas corpus. Into the mix of interests must be added
the principles of comity and finality, both of which support a
weaker rule favoring the state. Finality is fostered by rules that
preserve state convictions. Comity is a principle of deference to
state courts and is fostered by rules designed to preserve state
court judgments. In federal habeas corpus, these judgments necessarily are those that preserve state convictions.
The state's interest in finality and the preservation of its convictions exists on direct appeal and on habeas corpus, though that
interest grows stronger after the defendant leaves direct appeal
and enters post-conviction proceedings in federal court. The prin83. If the state court did not find error because the petitioner defaulted on the clamim,
then the Orndorff exception will not benefit the petitioner. The petitioner must show a
greater degree of prejudice to overcome the default than the showing he must make under
the interpretation of the Brecht rule advanced above. If the petitioner overcomes the default, the error necessarily will not be harmless under Brecht.
84. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 113 S. Ct. 1710, 1715 (1993).
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ciple of comity, in contrast, gains a foothold only in federal habeas
corpus when a federal habeas court threatens to upset the considered judgment of the state courts. Against this backdrop of competing interests, the Orndorff exception represents the view that
the state's finality interest in preserving its convictions in the face
of error is by itself insufficient to trigger the application of Brecht.
Rather, Brecht responds directly to the principle of comity, which
comes into play only if there is in fact a state court judgment to
which a federal court can defer. The Orndorfj exception is thus
based on the theory that the primary function of the Brecht rule is
to accord and enforce deference to state court applications of
Chapman. The rule advances the state's interest in finality only as
8
a by-product.
B.

Trial Error and Structural Error

The characterization of certain errors as "trial errors" and others
as "structural errors" was introduced into harmless error jurisprudence in Arizona v. Fulminante,6 though this distinction had perhaps been implicit before. The two categories identify those errors
that are susceptible to harmless error analysis and those that are
not. The first step in harmless error analysis is therefore to characterize the error at issue as a "trial" or "structural" one. "Trial errors" are subject to harmless error analysis. "Structural errors" are
not; for them, a rule of automatic reversal applies.
"Trial errors" are "error[s] which occurred during the presentation of the case to the jury, and which may therefore be quantitatively assessed in the context of other evidence presented in order
to determine whether its admission was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. '8 7 "Structural errors," on the other hand, lie "[a]t the
other end of the spectrum of constitutional errors." 88 Errors of this

85. Importantly, Brecht requires and enforces deference to state court judgments regarding harmlessness by weakening the standard of harmless error applied in federal habeas
corpus, not by changing the applicable standard of review. That is, if the state courts have
applied Chapman to uphold a conviction or sentence despite the existence of constitutional
error, a federal habeas court applies Brecht de novo rather than reviewing the state court's
application of Chapman under a clearly erroneous standard.
86. 111 S. Ct. 1246 (1991).
87. Id. at 1264.
88. Brecht, 113 S. Ct. at 1717.
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sort "require[] automatic reversal of the conviction because they
infect the entire trial process."' 9 The Court has yet to elaborate
further on this dichotomy, but the idea that these two types of
errors lie on, or perhaps define the endpoints of, a spectrum suggests room for dispute, at least at the margin.
As explained m Fulminante, the distinction between trial error
and structural error is based on the truth-seeking function of the
trial process and the reliability of the result reached through that
process. Trial errors have a definite, discrete and identifiable effect
on the quantum of evidence presented to the trier of fact. Harmless error analysis is therefore possible in principle because a reviewing court can more or less confidently evaluate the effect of
the error. The impact of a structural error, in contrast, cannot be
so readily isolated or confidently assessed. The nature of a structural error is to undermine a reviewing court's ability to evaluate
with any precision the impact of the error on the verdict. Structural errors are resistant to harmless error analysis because a reviewing court cannot readily assess their effect.
Fulminante offered as examples of "structural error" depriving a
defendant of counsel;9" trying a defendant before a biased judge; 91
excluding members of the defendant's race from a grand jury;92 denying a defendant's right to self-representation at trial;93 and denying a defendant's right to a public trial.9 4 The Court recently
added constitutionally deficient "reasonable doubt" instructions to
this list.9 5 Violations of Witherspoon v. Illinois,96 which helps secure a capital defendant's right to an impartial jury, are also immune to harmless error analysis. 7
Some commentators have suggested that the Court's explanation
of the distinction between trial error and structural error does not
account adequately for all the errors the Court has characterized as

89. Id. (citing Fulmmnante, 111 S. Ct. at 1254).
90. See Fulmmnante, 111 S. Ct. at 1264-65 (citing Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335
(1963)).
91. See id. (citing Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927)).
92. See id. (citing Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254 (1986)).
93. See id. (citing McKaskIe v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168 (1984)).
94. See id. (citing Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39 (1984)).
95. See Sullivan v. Louisiana, 113 S. Ct. 2078, 2082-83 (1993).
96. 391 U.S. 510 (1968).
97. See Gray v. Mississippi, 481 U.S. 648, 668 (1987) (plurality opinion).
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"structural."9 8 A reviewing court may, for example, be justifiably
confident that the exclusion of members of the defendant's race
from the grand jury that indicted him would have made no difference in the outcome of the trial because the evidence of guilt
presented at trial was overwhelming. Indeed, a court will possess
such confidence toward any proceeding marred by structural error,
as long as the applicable harmless error rule incorporates an outcome-focused approach and there is overwhelming evidence of
guilt.
This observation has led to the view that at least some of the
errors the Court has described as structural might alternatively, or
perhaps better, be explained by the fact that these errors arise
from the breach of rules that do not directly regulate the admission of evidence and that serve some purpose other than promoting
reliability 9 9 Inasmuch as they advance some purpose other than
reliability, a violation of these rules will commonly have no discrete and identifiable evidentlary effect. Lacking such an effect,
they afford no reason to believe the jury would have acted differently had the error not occurred. A violation of these rules would
thus always be deemed harmless. Consequently, to subject these
rules to harmless error analysis would in essence convert the rights
supported by these rules into rights without remedies.10 0 These

98. See, e.g., Henry P Monaghan, Harmless Error and the Valid Rule Requirement,
1989 Sup. CT. REV. 195, 204; Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., Arizona v. Fulmmante: The Harm of
Applying Harmless Error to Coerced Confessions, 105 HARV. L. REV. 152, 163 (1991).
99. In line with this view, Justice Stevens has said that harmless error analysis should
not be employed "when an independent value besides reliability of the outcome suggests
that such an analysis is inappropriate." United States v. Lane, 474 U.S. 438, 474 (1986)
(Stevens, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part); accord Dawson v. Delaware, 112 S.
Ct. 1093, 1100 (1992) (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 587 (1986)
(Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
In United States v. Olano, 113 S. Ct. 1770 (1993), Justice Stevens wrote in dissent:
At least some defects bearing on the jury's deliberative function are subject to
reversal regardless of whether prejudice can be shown, not only because it is so
difficult to measure their effects on a jury's decision, but also because such
defects "undermin[e] the structural integrity of the criminal tribunal itself."
Id. at 1782-83 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasis added) (quoting Vasquez v. Hillery, 474
U.S. 254, 263-64 (1986)). But cf. Brecht, 113 S. Ct. at 1730-31 (O'Connor, J., dissenting)
(suggesting that less protectign be afforded rights that do not "impair confidence in the
trial's outcome").
100. See, e.g., Field, supra note 59, at 20 ("[I]f violation of a rule is generically harmless
and cannot lead to reversal, then unless some other means of enforcing the rule is provided,
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rights can only be protected 1and enforced by shielding them with a
10
rule of automatic reversal.
C.

ProsecutorialMisconduct and Cumulatwe Error

The ninth footnote in the opinion of the Chief Justice in Brecht
will, as Justice O'Connor correctly predicted, be a rich source of
future litigation. The footnote reads in relevant part as follows:
Our holding does not foreclose the possibility that in an unusual
case, a deliberate and especially egregious error of the trial type,
or one that is combined with a pattern of prosecutorial misconduct, might so infect the integrity of the proceedings as to war-

it will be reduced to an empty exhortation.") (footnote omitted); Monaghan, supra note 98,
at 204 ("[A]pplication of harmless error analysis might effectively render the relevant constitutional commands judicially unenforceable.").
101. In principle, there are three distinct types of rules whose breach should be subject to
a rule of automatic reversal. First are rules whose purpose is not based on reliability or
truth-seeking. Such rules can be breached with impunity unless they are subject to a rule of
automatic reversal. Second are reliability-based rules whose breach gives rise to error the
effect of which is such that a reviewing court cannot tell one way or the other whether or not
the error was prejudicial. This appears to be what the Court intends by its distinction between structural and trial error. Third are reliability-based rules whose breach gives rise to
error the effect of which can be evaluated by a reviewing court, but that it would not be
cost-effective to subject to a totality-of-the-circumstance harmless error rule because the
error is rarely harmless. See, e.g., Ogletree, supra note 98, at 164 (suggesting that the trial
error-structural error distinction is better understood in terms of a "generic distinction between general standards and bright line rules").
It would seem to make sense to talk about particular types of rules, and errors arising
from their breach, as being subject to automatic reversal or harmless error analysis only if
the approach used is error-focused. Under an outcome-focused approach, the likelihood that
an error is harmless or not depends on the other evidence presented at trial. Consequently,
there is no systematic relationship under the outcome-focused approach between the type of
error and the likelihood that the error was harmless or not. It all depends on what other
evidence was presented.
This explains the difference between Chief Justice Rehnquist and Professor Ogletree over
whether coerced confessions should be subject to harmless error analysis or automatic reversal. Based on an error-focused approach, Professor Ogletree persuasively argues that coerced
confessions usually will be harmful and accordingly should be subject to automatic reversal.
Based on an outcome-focused approach, the Chief Justice plausibly implies that one cannot
tell whether coerced confessions usually will or will not be harmless, since it all depends on
what other evidence of guilt there is. Yet what the Chief Justice overlooks is that the outcome-focused approach is inconsistent with any effort to classify certain errors as necessarily harmful, which is what the classification of certain errors as "structural" is intended to
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rant the grant of habeas relief,
even if it did not substantially
02
influence the jury's verdict.'
Footnote nine relies on Justice Stevens' concurring opinion in
Greer v. Miller, 0 3 and was no doubt included at Justice Stevens'
behest. In his concurrence in Greer, Justice Stevens urged that the
Kotteakos rule be applied to Doyle errors on habeas corpus, but he
was quick to add that "there may be extraordinary cases in which
the
error is so egregious, or is combined with other errors or
incidents of prosecutorial misconduct, that the integrity of the proceeding is called into question."'0 4
Combining these two passages, three different types of error may
fall outside the reach of the Brecht-Kotteakos rule and instead be
subject to the Chapman rule: (1) an "egregious" trial error arising
from a single instance of deliberate prosecutorial misconduct; (2) a
non-egregious trial error "combined with a pattern of prosecutorial
misconduct;" and (3) an error combined with other errors (i.e., cumulative error), such that "the integrity of the proceeding is called
into question."
The theory behind the first two exceptions appears to be based
on the realization that the Kotteakos rule may encourage the prosecution to deliberately disregard established constitutional rules.
By weakening the otherwise applicable harmless error rule, Brecht
will allow more errors to go unremedied than would Chapman.
Under Brecht an error detected in federal habeas corpus proceedings will now be more likely deemed harmless than it would have
been before Brecht. Consequently, Brecht increases the incentive
for prosecutors to ignore or willfully neglect constitutional limits
and to commit constitutional error. The first two exceptions respond to this problem by holding out the possibility that errors
arising from deliberate or willful disregard of constitutional rules
or "combined with a pattern of prosecutorial misconduct" will continue to be governed by Chapman.10 5

102. Brecht, 113 S. Ct. at 1722 n.9 (citation omitted).
103. 483 U.S. 756 (1987).
104. Id. at 769 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
105. Cf. Michael T. Fisher, Note, Harmless Error, ProsecutorialMisconduct and Due
Process: There's More to Due Process than the Bottom Line, 88 COLUM. L. Rav. 1298, 132324 (1988) ("Uniform application of the Doyle approach is necessary to deter prosecutors
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Related to the exceptions for prosecutorial misconduct is an
analogous exception for misconduct on the part of state courts.
The petitioner in Brecht had argued before the Supreme Court
that Chapman's stringent rule was required on federal habeas
corpus in order "to deter state courts from relaxing their own
guard in reviewing constitutional error." 10 6 The Court rejected this
argument, saying that "[a]bsent affirmative evidence that statecourt judges are ignoring their oath, we discount petitioner's argument that courts will respond to our ruling by violating their Article VI duty to uphold the Constitution. 1 0 7 This reply assumes the
vigilance of state courts, but it implicitly recognizes that if a
habeas petitioner can adduce "affirmative evidence" that state
court judges have violated their oath, Brecht may not apply Evidence that a state trial court deliberately allowed error to go unchecked or that a state appellate court applied Chapman in a perfunctory or otherwise inadequate fashion might thus call this
exception into play
The third exception-taken from Justice Stevens' concurrence in
Greer-is perhaps best understood as a variation of the structuralerror theory If structural errors are immune to harmless error
analysis because their impact cannot be evaluated with any precision, the same principle may be thought to apply to trials infected
with multiple errors. When a trial is tainted by a number of discrete trial errors it may be practically impossible to evaluate their
combined impact with any degree of confidence, even if the impact
of any single error could be calculated. At some point the number
of errors may be so great and their effects so interrelated that any
attempt to sort it all out would be sheer guesswork. At the very
least, this exception opens the door to relief predicated on cumulative error."'
from violating rules of conduct designed both to ensure the fairness and protect the mtegrity of the truth-seeking process.").
106. Brecht, 113 S.Ct. at 1721.
107. Id. (citing Robb v. Connolly, 111 U.S. 624, 637 (1884)).
108. Several courts of appeals have adopted cumulative error analysis on habeas corpus.
See, e.g., Derden v. McNeel, 978 F.2d 1453, 1456-59 (5th Cir. 1992) (en banc), cert. denied,
113 S. Ct. 2928 (1993); Lundy v. Campbell, 888 F.2d 467, 481 (6th Cir. 1989), cert. denied,
495 U.S. 950 (1990); Bell v. Duckworth, 861 F.2d 169, 170 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489
U.S. 1088 (1989). But see Scott v. Jones, 915 F.2d 1188, 1191 (8th Cir. 1990), cert. denied,
111 S.Ct. 1626 (1991).
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The Richmond Principle

Another exception involves errors that taint the penalty phase of
a capital trial. Though its precise parameters have yet to be set,
this exception limits the power of the federal courts to salvage
state-imposed death sentences by applying harmless error analysis.
Unlike the others, this exception is based on the axiom that the
authority to impose a capital sentence is within the exclusive province of the states and that when a federal court attempts to salvage
a death sentence in the face of constitutional error it will sometimes engage in what is in essence resentencing, thus violating that
axiom. At work in several of the Supreme Court's recent pronouncements,"0 9 this exception was perhaps most clearly stated in
Richmond v. Lewis. 110
The sentencing judge in Richmond had based the defendant's
death sentence on three aggravating circumstances, including a
finding that the offense was "especially heinous, cruel or depraved." ' Pursuant to the Arizona sentencing scheme, the judge
weighed these aggravating circumstances against the mitigating
circumstances, finding that there were no mitigating circumstances
"sufficiently substantial to call for leniency 11112 Speaking for the
Court, Justice O'Connor found that the "especially heinous" factor
relied upon by the trial judge was unconstitutionally vague on its
face, had not been properly limited and thus had impermissibly
skewed the sentencing calculus in favor of death."' As a result, the
defendant's death sentence violated the Eighth Amendment.
Despite this Eighth Amendment sentencing error, the defendant's death sentence could have been salvaged by the state supreme court on direct review The Arizona Supreme Court could
have done so by applying harmless error analysis or by weighing
aggravating and mitigating circumstances against one another after
109. See, e.g., Sochor v. Florida, 112 S. Ct. 2114, 2123 (1992); Stringer v. Black, 112 S. Ct.
1130, 1136, 1140 (1992) ("[U]se of a vague or imprecise aggravating factor in the weighing
process invalidates the sentence and at the very least requires constitutional harmless-error
analysis or reweighing in the state judicial system.") (emphasis added); Parker v. Dugger,
498 U.S. 308, 322-23 (1991); Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738, 754 (1990).
110. 113 S. Ct. 528 (1992).
111. Id. at 532.
112. Id. at 533.
113. Id. at 534-37.
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either eliminating the vague aggravating circumstance from the
sentencing calculus altogether or confining it through a constitutionally valid limiting construction.' 1 4 According to Justice
O'Connor, the Arizona Supreme Court availed itself of none of
those options, and the defendant's death sentence therefore could
not stand. 115
In remanding the case to the district court to issue an order
granting a writ of habeas corpus, Justice O'Connor said in no uncertain terms that "[w]here [a] death sentence has been infected
by a vague or otherwise constitutionally invalid aggravating factor,
the state appellate court or some other state sentencer must actually perform a new sentencing calculus, if the sentence is to
stand.""' 6 The Court itself did not undertake to salvage the defendant's death sentence, reserving that task for the "state appellate court or some other state sentencer."" 7 The lower federal
courts accordingly have understood Richmond to limit their authority to salvage death sentences infected by vague aggravating
circumstances." 8
In its narrowest form, the Richmond principle forbids a federal
habeas court from itself salvaging a death sentence in a so-called
"weighing" state, like Arizona, where that sentence is based on an
invalid aggravating circumstance and can be salvaged under state
law only by reweighing aggravating and mitigating circumstances.
Although the basis for this principle has yet to be made explicit, it
would appear based on the realization that to ask a federal habeas
court to salvage a death sentence under these circumstances
amounts to a request for the court to resentence the defendant.
But this power the federal courts do not possess. State defendants
can only be condemned by state authority
Outside the context of capital sentencing, harmless error analysis ordinarily involves a counterfactual inquiry into whether or not
the error affected the verdict. To the extent that any appellate

114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
86, 94
1992).

Id. at 535.
Id.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id.
See Smith v. Dixon, 996 F.2d 667, 676-77 (4th Cir. 1993); Wiley v. Puckett, 969 F.2d
n.8 (5th Cir. 1992); see also Jeffers v. Lewis, 974 F.2d 1075, 1084 & n.11 (9th Cir.
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court is equipped to conduct such an inquiry on the basis of a cold
record, the federal courts stand in virtually the same position as do
the state appellate courts. The same cannot be said in the context
of capital sentencing. In that context, harmless error analysis is intimately bound up with the moral inquiry that constitutes the substance of the death-selection decision. 119 The federal courts may be
just as able as the state courts to make this decision sub specie
aeternitatis,but the death-selection decision is supposed to reflect
the "conscience of the community"'120 in whose name the sentence
is imposed. Moreover, the link between that decision and the community is provided and established not by requiring the sentencer
to apply community standards, but rather by the fact that the sentencer is a member of the community 121 A federal court as such
cannot legitimately claim to speak in this capacity; only a state
court can.' 2 2
As already noted, the exact scope of the Richmond principle is
uncertain. While there will be circumstances, as in Richmond, in
which the federal courts do not have the authority to salvage a
death sentence because doing so would usurp state authority by
engaging in resentencing, there may be other circumstances in
which a federal court can salvage a death sentence without overstepping its bounds. At least three factors appear to make the process of "salvaging" more or less like resentencing: (1) the type of
sentencing scheme; (2) the type of error; and (3) the method of
salvaging established by state law
Each of these factors is related in some way to the distinction
between so-called "weighing states" and so-called "threshold
states." In a "threshold" state, the sentencer has complete discretion in assessing a sentence once it has found that the defendant

119. California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 545 (1987) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (stating that
the capital sentencing decision must represent a "reasoned moral response" to the offender
and offense).
120. Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 519 (1968).
121. See Stanton D. Krauss, Representing the Community: A Look at the Selection Process in Obscenity Cases and Capital Sentencing, 64 IND. L.J. 617, 617-18 (1989).
122. This rationale may weaken the ability to characterize harmless error analysis credibly as a mixed question of law and fact reviewable do novo in federal court. A state court
finding that an error is harmless starts to look more like the kind of finding to which the
federal courts must defer. Such deference, however, may .be enforced fully by the Brecht
standard itself. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
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passes the "death-eligible" threshold, i.e., once it finds the existence of a single aggravating circumstance.12 In such a system, aggravating circumstances perform one function: to set the death-eligible threshold.1 24 In contrast, aggravating circumstances in
"weighing" states perform two functions. Not only do they set the
death-eligible threshold, they also guide the jury's decision beyond
that point insofar as they are weighed or balanced by the jury
125
against mitigating circumstances in order to arrive at a sentence.
In order to salvage a death sentence that is invalid because it is
premised on an invalid aggravating circumstance, a reviewing court
in a weighing state may need to place itself more or less in the
same position as the initial sentencer. When reweighing is the
method of salvaging a death sentence prescribed by state law, a
federal habeas court will for all practical purposes be required to

resentence the defendant if the death sentence is to be upheld. 126

The court must assign a weight to each aggravating and mitigating
circumstance, consider all the nonstatutory aggravating and mitigating evidence and then balance all the circumstances and evidence against each other to arrive at a conclusion. It is legal fiction
to maintain that in so doing the reviewing court is not resentencing
the defendant.1 27 A federal habeas court thus acts most like a sentencer (and farthest outside the scope of its legitimate authority)
when it tries by reweighing to salvage a death sentence imposed in
a weighing state and based on an invalid aggravating circumstance.
It is difficult to say whether the Richmond principle does or
should apply where the three factors are aligned so that the federal
123. See, e.g., Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 870-74 (1983) (describing the "threshold"
capital sentencing scheme of Georgia).
124. Id.
125. See, e.g., Stringer v. Black, 112 S. Ct. 1130, 1136 (1992) (describing the operation of
Mississippi's capital sentencing scheme).
126. Embedded in this claim is an unsettled choice-of-law question: Assuming that a fedefal habeas court can salvage a death sentence involving an invalid aggravating circumstance and that the state courts have not salvaged the sentence themselves, is the method of
9
salvaging to be used by the federal court dictated by state law or by federal law If state
law, the method will be either harmless error analysis under Chapman or reweighing. If
federal law, the method will be harmless error analysis under Brecht. For present purposes,
it is assumed that the federal court must use the method prescribed by state law.
127. See Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738, 762 (1993) (Blackmun, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (stating that a reviewing state appellate court under Clemons
must "assume[] for itself the role of sentencer").
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habeas court acts considerably less like a sentencer. Consider, for
example, a death sentence imposed in a threshold state that is invalid because evidence used to support the finding of an aggravating circumstance was obtained in violation of the defendant's Sixth
Amendment right to counsel.-2" A federal habeas court asked to
salvage this sentence would not be required to reweigh, but rather
to decide whether or not the error "had a substantial and injurious
effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict." In doing so,
the court is initially distanced from the death-selection decision by
a presumption (albeit somewhat weaker than that of Chapman)
that the error was not harmless. That distance is increased because
in a threshold state such an error "does not infect the formal process of deciding whether death is an appropriate penalty ",129 Indeed, as long as the sentencer has found at least one valid aggravating circumstance, that "formal process" would remain
untouched even if the error arose from the fact that another aggravator was invalid. 130
However far the Richmond principle should and ultimately does
reach, its core is well-settled: A federal habeas court lacks the authority to reweigh aggravating and mitigating circumstances in order to salvage a death sentence imposed in a weighing state when
that sentence is infected by an invalid aggravating circumstance.
To authorize a federal court to uphold such a sentence would put
it in the role of sentencer. That role, however, can be legitimately
occupied only by a state actor.
III.

CoNcLusioN

More exists in Brecht than meets the eye. It is a complex rule,
the devil of which is in the details. Brecht itself does little more
than tell us once again how habeas corpus imposes too great a burden on the twin principles of comity and finality and then extracts
the standard used in Kotteakos to alleviate that burden. Kotteakos, we are told, is "less onerous" than Chapman, but from
Brecht itself it is hard to determine exactly how much less onerous
128. Cf. Satterwhite v. Texas, 486 U.S. 249 (1988).
129. Stringer, 112 S. Ct. at 1137.

130. Id.
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it is. A fair construction of Kotteakos and the surrounding law of
habeas corpus would suggest the differences are marginal.
Still, whatever its detail, any harmless error rule vests considerable discretion in the sound judgment of the reviewing court. Justice Stevens went so far as to state in Brecht that "the way we
phrase the governing standard is far less important than the quality of the judgment with which it is applied." 13 1 This bit of legal
realism contains a good deal of truth, but it cannot be gainsaid
that under Brecht a reviewing court's good judgment will be informed and guided by a rule heralded as "less onerous" than
Chapman. Consequently, it becomes all the more important for reviewing courts to keep in mind that if Brecht is less onerous than
Chapman, it is only modestly so. It does not, in any event, relieve
them of the burden and responsibility of judgment.

131. Brecht, 113 S. Ct. at 1725 (Stevens, J., concurring).

